1 pension system and summarize the reforms proposed by the author of the country study.
The summaries are intended to establish some background for the second section of this chapter in which we address some broad themes drawn from the country studies. We consider the authors' views on the importance of culture in explaining differences in approaches to pension issues. We also re ect on four primary goals for any pension system: 1) coverage of the population so that pensions are broadly available,
2) risk sharing so that the many risks inherent in any pension system are appropriately shared,
3) adequate bene ts to meet the country's goal of suf cient retirement standards, and 4) approaches to respond to increases in longevity.
Given our backgrounds, we view the complex pension systems described in this chapter through a U.S. lens.
To decrease the confusion that results from using different terms for essentially similar pension concepts, we adopt U.S. terminology in this chapter and throughout the rest of the book, even when different terminology would typically be used elsewhere in the world. So, for example, pension schemes (British terminology) are referred to here as pension plans or pension systems. And the government-administered portion of a country's pension system is typically referred to as social security.
NORTH AMERICA United States, John A. Turner and Dana M. Muir
The U.S. pension system is the only North American system covered in this book because, given the focus of the Network, the emphasis is on European pension systems. The U.S. and Japanese systems are included in the volume as points of comparison and discussion.
The U.S. pension system requires nearly all workers to participate in the social security system, which provides a de ned bene t pension to workers who meet minimum criteria. In addition, the U.S. provides tax incentives for employer-sponsored pension plans, which may be dened bene t or de ned contribution plans, and for individual retirement savings in accounts such as Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs). The social security plan is the only mandatory plan. Sponsorship of dened bene t or de ned contribution plans by employers is voluntary, as are individual savings accounts. Employer-sponsored plans have been heavily regulated since 1974. In spite of various incentives intended to increase coverage of employer-sponsored plans, however, coverage rates have never exceeded much more than 50 percent.
Numerous interest groups recognize that planned and potential reductions in the social security system, limited coverage of employersponsored plans, poor uptake of individual plans, and the transition from de ned bene t to de ned contribution plans means that the U.S. pension system needs reform. Turner and Muir brie y discuss some of those proposals, which advocate very different approaches. Turner and Muir conclude that the importance of individual freedom in U.S. culture means that the voluntary nature of the employer-sponsored pension system should be retained. Still, Turner and Muir believe that the current system can be modi ed to enhance coverage, better allocate risks, and increase adequacy of bene ts. As an example, they advocate measures, including changes in tax and funding rules, that would help equalize the attractiveness to employers of de ned bene t and de ned contribution plans. One example is a recommendation to permit employee tax-deductible contributions to de ned bene t plans. They also suggest that the demographic issue of an aging population that is so costly to employer-sponsored de ned bene t plans could be addressed in part by reallocating some of the demographic risks. The plans could retain the idiosyncratic risk of longer than average life expectancies for individual workers, while the cohort risk could be shifted to plan participants as a group.
EUROPE
Although the eight European countries studied in this volume (except Switzerland) all are members of the European Union (EU), the pension systems vary considerably in terms of structure, coverage, risk sharing, adequacy, and approach to increasing longevity.
United Kingdom, Bryn Davies
The United Kingdom (UK) has a two-part mandatory pension system administered by the government (social security) that in combination applies to all employees, is earnings related, and provides a de ned bene t pension. A move is under way to transform the earningsrelated bene t to a at-rate bene t (not related to earnings but increasing with years of contributions) and to increase the retirement age. The United Kingdom also has a system of voluntary employer-sponsored pension plans, which may be either de ned bene t or de ned contribution plans. Beginning in 2001, most employers that do not offer a pension plan meeting minimum standards must designate what is known as a "stakeholder" plan to receive employee contributions from those employees who wish to contribute, although neither employers nor employees are required to contribute to these plans. The UK pension system, other than the social security pension, essentially remains a voluntary system of de ned bene t or de ned contribution plans where risks are borne almost completely by the employer or the employee depending on the type of plan.
Davies advocates a four-part system. The rst two parts would be mandatory systems administered by the government (social security). Together they would provide a at-rate bene t at 60 percent of median household income for a single person and an additional amount depending on the individual's lifetime earnings. In addition, Davies proposes an incentivized pension at the occupational or other collective level. The combination of this collectively based earnings-related pension and the social security bene ts would provide individuals with a pension that would meet the target replacement ratio. Finally, Davies's proposal calls for a fourth component for individuals who desire a more generous pension. The government would facilitate that component through regulation but would not necessarily encourage savings into that component.
Ireland, Gerard Hughes and Jim Stewart
Ireland's pension system has a mandatory government-administered pension (social security) that is paid as a at-rate de ned bene t. It has an additional two-part system for private sector employees. Employers may provide either de ned bene t or de ned contribution plans for their employees. The trend has been for employers to shift their sponsorship from de ned bene t to de ned contribution plans. Individuals not covered by an employer-sponsored pension plan may establish an individual pension plan. Over the past 10 years, the pensioner poverty rate has been volatile. In recent years, the social security bene t has increased more quickly than workers' earnings, and the at-risk-of-poverty rates for pensioners decreased to slightly more than 11 percent in 2008.
Hughes and Stewart propose a universal social security system that would further decrease or eliminate the risk of poverty for pensioners in Ireland. They show that the current social security system provides most of the income for most pensioners, and only those in the top quintile of the income distribution derive a signi cant portion of their total pension income from an employer-sponsored or individual pension plan. Hughes and Stewart advocate decreasing the tax relief for employer-sponsored and individual pension plans and suggest reallocating those resources into the social security system to improve that system's ability to support pensioners in an equitable and sustainable manner.
Denmark, Finn Østrup
The government of Denmark administers a universal social security pension system that provides de ned bene ts. Also, the Danish pension system includes employment-based de ned contribution plans that cover nearly all employees. These plans arise from centralized wage agreements or company policies and have guaranteed minimum rates of interest. In addition, workers are encouraged to participate in personal pension plans by tax incentives.
In addressing risks to pensioners, Østrup observes and criticizes the political uncertainty in the Danish pension system. He explains multiple instances where the government of Denmark has changed the taxation of plan bene ts and sought to use pension plan assets to fund business enterprises, including troubled nancial institutions in 2008. Østrup points out that, compared to other industrial countries, Denmark has a very low household savings rate. Østrup also concludes that the complexity of the Danish pension system results in a lack of transparency. After detailed analysis comparing funded and unfunded pension systems as well as de ned bene t and de ned contribution bene t structures, Østrup concludes that there is no single optimal pension system. In his view, optimality in a pension system depends on the broad spectrum of goals of the pension system, including not just income replacement after retirement but also effects on labor supply and nancial markets.
Germany, Markus Roth
Germany has the oldest social security system in the world. It provides an income-related de ned bene t. It also has a voluntary system of pensions that is made up of employer-sponsored plans and individual pensions, but that system is moving from an employer-sponsored system to one that has elements of employee nancing. The voluntary system covers approximately 60 percent of the German workforce but often provides only a small bene t. New forms of plans have been introduced in Germany, such as a de ned bene t with a guaranteed return.
Roth observes that the German law on both individual and occupational pensions needs to be systematized. His view is that de ned bene t plans are not categorically more appropriate than de ned contribution or hybrid plans for individual and occupational pensions. Roth advocates use of a pension protection triangle and a loyally administered separate fund to model protective principles. Roth's pension protection triangle is formed by consideration of exit (termination of a pension contract), voice (consultation), and guarantees. He makes a number of speci c suggestions to improve Germany's occupational pensions, including recommending the use of automatic enrollment in de ned contribution occupational pension plans.
Belgium, Kim De Witte
Belgium's pension system has a mandatory governmentadministered component (social security) that covers all workers, is income-based, and is paid as a de ned bene t. In addition, employers may, but are not required to, sponsor de ned bene t or de ned contribution plans for their workers. Approximately 60 percent of workers are covered by a work-related pension plan. Many of these plans are industry-wide plans that arise from collective bargaining rather than plans that are sponsored by individual employers. One somewhat unusual provision of Belgium's pension regulation is a requirement that de ned contribution pensions include a minimum guarantee rate, currently 3.25 percent for employer contributions and 3.75 percent for employee contributions. Finally, in addition to the social security and work-based pension plans, Belgium permits voluntary individual pension savings arrangements on a de ned contribution basis.
After discussing the shortcomings of the current pension system in Belgium, De Witte explains the reform proposals advocated by the main social and political groups. De Witte then develops a comprehensive set of criteria to evaluate the reform proposals and evaluates various approaches to pension accrual against the broad categories of
• degree of redistributive solidarity,
• scope of risk sharing, and
• protection of pension rights.
Each of these broad categories is de ned by subcategories. So, for example, longevity is an explicit factor in the scope of risk sharing category and an implicit factor in the protection of pension rights category through subcategories that differentiate between lump sum and annuitized bene t entitlements. De Witte advocates an ideal system for Belgium that would include a social security bene t of 60 percent of nal salary and an additional amount of up to 15 percent (for a maximum total of 75 percent of nal salary) from tax-incentivized individual or work-related pensions.
France, Lucy apRoberts and Pierre Concialdi
The French pension system is a government-administered mandatory system that covers all private sector workers by providing a means-tested minimum pension and work-related pensions as de ned bene ts (social security). Fewer than 8 percent of retirees receive the minimum means-tested bene t. Mandatory work-related supplementary plans provide about one-third of the pension bene ts received by the average retiree. The supplementary work-related plans are organized along occupational lines, but the plans have been increasingly consolidated. The replacement rate achieved by the French system is among the highest in Europe.
apRoberts and Concialdi preface their discussion of prospective changes in the French social security system with a concise history of the development of the current system. They then take issue with the French government's projections for the future of the country's pension system and state that the government believes that it is not possible to increase pension contributions. apRoberts and Concialdi believe that the cumulative nature of the many changes that have taken place in the French pension system will, if left unchanged, result in drastically reduced pensions in the future. They argue that the French social security system can and should be reinforced to receive increased revenues and pay appropriately generous bene ts. They also point out the linkage between full and well-paid employment and levels of retirement income security. In any pension system with a work-and income-based pension component, unemployed and underemployed individuals will not earn the pension bene ts they would in a system of full employment with well-paid jobs.
Switzerland, Matthieu Leimgruber
Switzerland has two mandatory components to its pension system and a voluntary third component. The Swiss government administers a mandatory social security plan that covers all workers and pays earnings-related de ned bene ts. In addition, the mandatory workrelated bene t plans cover approximately 90 percent of the workforce and constitute an increasingly large proportion of the expenditure in Switzerland on pensions. Coverage by this component of the Swiss sys-tem is less than universal because there is a wage oor, which results in the exclusion of low-wage and temporary workers. The work-related plans are required to provide a minimum guaranteed return on invested assets. The third component of the Swiss pension system is made up of voluntary individual pensions.
Leimgruber engages in a historical analysis of the Swiss pension system, concentrating on the work-related pensions that have attracted signi cant controversy in recent years. He argues that speci c pension reforms that may appear merely technical matters must be understood in the larger context of the multiple components of the Swiss pension system and the dynamics that affect that system. In early 2010, Swiss voters rejected a proposal that would have reduced those bene ts. Leimgruber observes that the development of the mandatory workrelated pension system was designed in part to improve the levels of pension bene ts and in part to discourage the enhancement of the social security system. He explains the important role he believes that business forces, including the providers of pension investments and services, such as life insurers that provide group pension contracts, have played in the structure of the Swiss pension system. Leimgruber expects that the work-related component of pensions will become increasingly important in debates over the provision of pensions.
Poland, Marek Szczepa ski
The pension system in Poland underwent signi cant reform in 1999, resulting in two side-by-side systems. Szczepa ski addresses only the structure of the pension system as it applies to individuals who were below age 30 at the time of the reform. The government of Poland administers a mandatory notional de ned contribution system (social security). A second component provides funded de ned contribution bene ts and a third component that is voluntary also is de ned contribution. The pension system is made up of both work-based pension plans and individual pension plans. The voluntary third component covers only about eight percent of the workforce. Szczepa ski concentrates his analysis on the problems associated with the voluntary de ned contribution component of the Polish pension system. He establishes an analytic framework that divides the barriers for development of the occupational portion of the voluntary component into exogenous and endogenous factors. He further divides exogenous factors into variables of institutional or noninstitutional character. Szczepa ski divides the endogenous factors into employer-and employee-related variables. He concludes with speci c recommendations for improving pension coverage, improving adequacy of pension bene ts, and mitigating both nancial market and longevity risks. For example, he suggests that workers could be automatically enrolled, with an opportunity to opt out, into voluntary work-based plans to increase coverage. To increase the adequacy of pension bene ts, he suggests equalizing the statutory retirement age of women with the retirement age for men, which currently is 65. Finally, he observes the importance of limiting fees and charges in a de ned contribution system.
ASIA Japan, Noriyasu Watanabe
Understanding the Japanese pension system provides context for the views of the European contributors to this volume. Japan administers a compulsory earnings-related pension plan paid as a de ned bene t that supplements the basic pension, also provided through the government (together forming social security). Two different types of work-related pension plans may be established by employers. Both types are de ned bene t and played an important role until 2001, when pension reform rst permitted de ned contribution plans, amended work-related pension systems, and introduced a new corporate de ned bene t plan. The new de ned contribution plans may be either work related or set up by an individual.
Watanabe's analysis shows a number of weaknesses in the 2001 reform. For example, he notes two problems with de ned contribution plans. First, Japan does not have the strict duciary responsibility regulations that are important in maintaining the integrity of any de ned contribution system. Second, the lack of transparency and fairness in the Japanese nancial markets is dangerous for de ned contribution plans. Watanabe particularly criticizes the past approach to corporate pension policy for its concentration on addressing minor technical issues instead of the broader structural issues. His recommendations include a call for greater understanding of the importance of strong employee welfare systems in contributing to pro table corporations and the role for pension plans in those systems. Among other recommendations, he also calls for a full review and reconstruction of all social security systems in Japan.
BROAD THEMES DRAWN FROM THE COUNTRY STUDIES
Although the country studies are intended to stand alone, in this section, we draw some broad themes from the country studies. One of the many advantages of the Network is the ability to exchange ideas on common approaches, issues, and solutions. Similarly, the Network provides a forum for respectful professional debate and disagreement.
Importance of Culture in Explaining Differences in Approaches
Underlying pension systems is a complex web of cultural considerations. Those considerations may affect the technical choices of a pension system, and they may also affect the broader policy goals that are inherent in the structure of pension systems. A careful reader will see, sometimes explicitly, but more often implicitly, the effect of culture on the various country systems studied here.
For example, Turner and Muir believe that the high priority placed on individualism in U.S. culture should constrain the mandates imposed on U.S. employment-based and individual retirement plans. In contrast, in Watanabe's study of Japan, he observes the importance of the large number of companies that have been in business for hundreds of years. This pattern of business longevity is often attributed to harmony between a company and its employees (as well as between the company and its customers and society) and a history of lump-sum severance payments that dates from the seventeenth century. The importance placed on the relationship between a company and its current and past employees can be seen in Watanabe's recommendation that stable employee welfare systems, particularly pension plans, contribute to corporate pro tability.
These cultural norms of individualism in the United States and of corporate responsibility in Japan stand in stark contrast with the current and ideal systems discussed in some of the European country studies in which government programs are recognized as being the primary route to reliable and reasonably generous pensions. In France, the government plays the primary role in the provision of pension bene ts. The mandatory de ned bene t pensions provided through the programs of the French government, combined with marginal employerprovided and individual pensions and property income, provide a standard of living for pensioners equivalent to that of other French households. apRoberts and Concialdi argue that the French system of governmental pension provision should be retained and cutbacks that have occurred over time should be rescinded.
Similarly, Hughes and Stewart show that the government-provided social security pension in Ireland provides the largest share of income for households headed by a person aged 65 and over. Not only are government-provided pensions viewed as an acceptable source of pension income in Ireland, Hughes and Stewart argue that resources from the current tax support of nongovernmentally provided pensions should be shifted to government pensions because it would result in a fairer and sustainable pension system. Even in the United Kingdom, which perhaps has the closest historical and cultural position to the United States among the countries considered in this book, the Pension Commission suggested in 2005 that the government should provide a at-rate pension at a level that would prevent pensioner poverty. The Pension Commission then suggested an opt-out earnings-related pension for the next supplemental tier of the pension system. The ndings to date of behavioral economics teach us that in operation an opt-out system comes very close to being a mandatory system. Davies goes even further and argues that second tier earnings-related pensions should be mandatory.
In contrast with these other European countries, Szczepa ski argues that Poles do not want to rely on the government of Poland exclusively for pension provision in part because of historical experience. In 1999, Poland put into effect a complicated new pension system, leaving in place the old system for individuals who were aged 50 or older on the date of implementation. The new individual and work-related pensions authorized and encouraged by that reform have not resulted in signi -cant rates of coverage by those plans. The Polish people, thus, appear to have become skeptical of relying too heavily on government involvement in the pension system.
In addition to the European cultural acceptance of a larger role of government in pension provision than in the United States, solidarity is also an important norm in many European countries. This norm can be seen in the Belgian system. Solidarity across workers is re ected in the industry-wide pension plans that cover approximately 60 percent of the workforce in Belgium. De Witte identi es three types of redistributive solidarity and categorizes alternative types of pension accrual, in part, according to the type of redistributive solidarity provided. Ultimately, redistributive solidarity is one of the evaluative criteria De Witte suggests be used in identifying an ideal pension system for Belgium. Davies states that some redistribution is appropriate for pension systems and that it plays an especially important role in pensions for women because of their lower average wages.
Insights on Speci c Topics

Improving coverage
Although widespread pension coverage through nongovernmental pension programs is not unheard of, most of the countries studied in this book have voluntary employment-based pension systems that achieve only moderate levels of workforce coverage. Switzerland, however, mandates work-based pension systems and has achieved coverage of about 90 percent of its workforce. The exceptions are low-wage and part-time workers because the Swiss mandate has a wage oor. Belgium also appears to have one of the strongest systems of workplace pension provision. De Witte attributes its high coverage rate at least in part to the fact that many of the plans are industry-wide collectively bargained plans.
In contrast to Switzerland and Belgium, less than half of Irish retirees over age 65 reported receiving a work-related pension. Poland is an even more extreme example of the low end of the coverage spectrumonly 2 percent of workers are covered by work-related pension plans. The country experts appear to be in general agreement that there are three ways to increase coverage rates in work-related pensions. Pension systems could do three things: 1) make work-related pension provision mandatory, 2) make participation in work-related pensions the default with an opt-out opportunity, or 3) increase the incentives for sponsorship and participation in work-related pensions.
A number of countries, including Ireland and the United States, have tried the third approach (i.e., tax incentives) for a number of years. The problems observed with this approach include that tax incentives are of less value to lower paid workers than to higher paid workers and that lower paid workers have less disposable income to contribute to retirement plans.
Not surprisingly, then, given the cultural norms against mandates in some countries, multiple country experts suggest that the second approach, that of coverage defaults with opt-out opportunities, could be an appropriate way to increase pension coverage. Interestingly, this approach is suggested in countries that have quite different pension systems and cultural histories. For example, Szczepa ski believes that defaults may be useful in Poland, and Turner and Muir make a similar suggestion for the United States. Turner and Muir also acknowledge, though, that there is a danger in defaults in the United States because the system permits distributions from plans for hardships or when workers change employers. If individuals are not committed to pension savings, they may decide to take early distributions, even though they are penalized by the U.S. tax system.
Sharing risks
The global nancial crisis reinforced the importance of risk in pension systems. All of the country experts raised concerns about a broad spectrum of risks. The global nancial crisis highlighted the risk that an employer might voluntarily, or upon its bankruptcy, terminate a de ned bene t plan, resulting in reduced bene ts for current or future retirees. In de ned contribution plans, the decline of nancial markets has resulted in lower account asset levels and dropping interest rates.
Financial market risks and reform proposals related to the bene ts provided by de ned bene t and de ned contribution plans are somewhat dif cult to categorize because, in part, they are speci c to the details of a country's pension system. Nuances that are important in a given country are lost as this summary becomes quite general. As an example, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan are the only countries with a formal insurance program for de ned bene t plans, and those programs decrease the employee risk of employer bankruptcy in those countries. But other countries widely use insurance contracts that are quite stable to prefund work-based de ned bene t plans, and these contracts also reduce plan risks. Roth discusses the use of book reserves recorded on a company's balance sheet in lieu of a separate fund for occupational pensions in Germany. This is changing as German companies, especially large ones, revise their approach to meet international accounting standards.
Financial market risks are not the only pension plan risks observed. Both Szczepa ski and Watanabe suggest that nancial market regulations in their respective countries, Poland and Japan, are insuf cient to appropriately protect individuals who depend on de ned contribution plans for their pensions. Szczepa ski and Østrup note that a history of governmental amendment or proposed amendment of pension regulations in Poland and Denmark, respectively, imposes risks on the pension systems. Szczepa ski explicitly recognizes the skepticism of Poles toward government policymakers and states it is a source of Poles' preference not to be entirely dependent on a government-provided pension system. apRoberts and Concialdi discuss the series of technical changes made by the French government to its pension system that are projected to signi cantly reduce future pensions. They counter this risk by arguing that the governmental system is the safest and most appropriate choice for France, but that it needs to be restored to prior levels. Relating to the political risks affecting bene t levels, Leimgruber recounts the recent rejection by Swiss voters of provisions that would have decreased pension bene ts.
Providing adequate bene ts
Most if not all of the country studies discuss the question of how much pension is required to provide adequate bene ts. In accordance with traditional concepts in pension policy, most country experts write in terms of replacement income. That, of course, simply rephrases the real question as: what level of replacement income is necessary to pro-vide adequate bene ts? The authors consider the answer to that question as a percentage, often relying on policy documents or studies in their home countries to set an approximate appropriate standard. Davies's discussion for the United Kingdom is reasonably indicative. He looks to World Bank policy and a 2004 UK Pensions Commission report to conclude that replacement rates should be between 65 and 75 percent for those earning median incomes. In the proposed system, replacement percentages would be set to provide higher percentages for low-income earners, and there would be a at-rate oor to prevent pensioner poverty. Østrup, in comparison, approaches the question from the perspective of the goals of the pension system and Danish culture. He points out that consumption goals in retirement may be highly individualized, may depend on a standard of living relative to a reference group such as those who practice the same profession as the retiree, or may depend on the standard of living the retiree enjoyed while employed.
Even to the extent that country experts agree as a general matter with this approach, they do not necessarily agree on how to calculate the replacement percentages and what should happen after the pension begins. Should replacement percentages be determined on the last wage earned, or should there be some averaging of earnings over a preretirement period? And, if the pension is indexed once payments begin, how should that indexation occur? apRoberts and Concialdi argue that France's change from indexing to current wages to indexing to current prices will result in lower pension payments and will deprive French retirees of their fair share of gains in labor productivity.
Responding to increased longevity
Increased longevity may affect pension plans on the previously discussed aspects of dimensions of risk and provision of adequate bene ts. From a risk standpoint, in a de ned bene t plan where the pensioners outlive the expectations under which the plan was funded, costs will be higher and additional funds will need to be contributed to the plan. In an unfunded de ned bene t plan, costs similarly increase, perhaps beyond the ability or willingness of the funding entity to maintain the plan and bene ts. In a government-funded plan, this may raise the specter of political risk. And, if indexation is insuf cient, pensioners receiving dened bene ts will see their pension income whittled away by in ation.
In a de ned contribution plan, the risk is that an especially longlived pensioner might outlive the account assets even if the pensioner is reasonably conservative in making account withdrawals. That, of course, overlaps with adequacy risk. Similarly, since many de ned contribution plans permit bene ts to be paid as a lump sum, pensioners may have the choice to be the opposite of conservative, resulting in a decreased or completely exhausted pension in later years.
Turner and Muir offer a proposal to help counter the longevity risk of increased de ned bene t plan costs. They suggest that U.S. law be amended to permit de ned bene t plans to shift the cohort risk to plan participants, who are better able than employers to bear that risk. They observe that the idiosyncratic risk of longer-than-average life expectancies should remain on the plan, which is better able than individuals to bear that particular risk.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter we brie y summarized the pension systems of the countries studied as well as examined some of the most signi cant themes that we observed in the studies. We provide these summaries not as a digest of all of the important ideas that can be drawn from the individual chapters, because the country experts provide a wealth of insights and thoughts about the ideal pension system for each of their countries. Instead, we hope the themes provide a basis for our readers to delve deeper into this book and a platform to compare the proposals and perspectives of this group of pension experts.
